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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

~T_A_rrE

OF UTAH, by and through its
EXGIX:B~ERING COMMI'SSION, D.
H. \\7"HlTTENBl. . RG, Chair1nan, H.
J. COR.LEISSEN and LAY T 0 N
~L_\XFIELD, ~{embers of the Engineering Conunission,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
"7867

BlTRTON F. PEEK and CHARLES D.
WI~I.A.~, Trustees under the Will and
of the Estate of CHARLES H.
DEERE, Deceased,
Defendants and Appellants.

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

c·hapter 13, First Special Session, Laws of Utah
1951, became effective June 18th of that year. (Session
Laws, p. 17.) By that Act plaintiff was required "forthwith" to condemn for State Park purposes a large tract
of land ~pecifically described by metes and bounds. (Act,
1
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Sec. 8a.) Pursuant thereto on July 10, 1951 the Engineering Cormnission pa~sed a "Condemnation Resolution"
(R. 5) and irnn1ediately thereafter filed its complaint in
the District Court of Salt Lake County. (Case No. 92516.)
This co1nplaint contains the usual averments to
support the prayer for condemnation, sets forth the interests which the various defendants may have or claim,
and then ipsa dixit allocates the land to be condemned
and the interests of the various defendants into twentyeight "parcels" and two additional "outstanding interests". (R. 1-20.) Tvventy-seven of these "parcels" consist of described tracts owned hy na1ned defendants other
than the appellants. (R. 6-15.) "Parcel 28" is then in
effect described as the entire property exactly as set out
in the legislative rnandate, less the twenty-seven other
described parcels and so1ne other interests for unassjgned
reasons also excluded. ( R. 15-1'7.)
The tract which the Utah Legislature at its special
session commanded plaintiff "to forthwith condemn" is
an area of several square miles located at the mouth of
Emigration Canyon east of Salt Lake City. It includes
130.23 acres of a total of approximately 215.73 acres
owned by these particular defendants and appellants in
the general vicinity; the Jerry Jones tract of 5. 7 acres;
the Tedesco tract of 6.46 acres ; the Wheelwright tract
of 9.41 acres; twenty-six individual subdivided residential lots comprising a total of some 8 acres owned by
various defendants, on some of which homes were in
various stages of construction; and 7.66 acres of dedicated streets other tha.n the 'State Highway through
2
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}:InigTation Canyon \Vith it~ branch to the adjaePnt
~Lonu1nent and the u1ain County Road leading to the
~outh. T'he area. \\·a~ in Yariou~ ~tage~ of develop1nent
fron1 bare n1ountain~ide to ro1npleted residPnees in
platted and re~tricted subdiYisions \\~herein were in place
dedieated streets, curb and gutter, drainage facilitie~,
iire hydrantt' and the usual utilities of water, power,
telephone and ga~. (lt Ex. 1, p. 154.)
Because of the large extent of the area involving
nu1nerous defendants and interests, pursuant to Section
104-35-6 of the Judicial Code and Rule 42(h) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure plaintiff asked the court in its discretion to sever issues pertaining to these particular
defendants (R. 51) ; and the court so ordered ( R. 51, 82).
It wa8 also ordered pursuant to stipulation that a separate record in this case should be maintained pertaining
to these parties only ( R. 89-90), hereinafter referred to
a~ the ··plaintiff" and the "Deere Estate" or "defendant~~·.

In addition to the usual prayer for condemnation
the eon1plaint prayed for an order of immediate occupancy ""for the purpose of commencing such construction
and in1provement of a State Park." (R. 19.) However,
the Legislature had enacted no plans for such construction and improvement beyond the bare condemnation
Inandate, and this motion was not pressed but in fact
'\\C'as resisted by plaintiff. (R. 82.) Summons was served
on July 12, 1951, whereupon there became applicable the
provisions of Section 104-34-11 of the Judicial Code,
which reads as follows :
3
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104-34-ll.

When Right to Damages Deemed to
Ha/ce Accrued.

For the purpose of assessing compensation
and da1nages, the right thereto shall be deemed to
have accrued at the date of the service of su1n1nons, and its actual value at that date shall be
the 1neasure of con1pensation for all property to
be actually taken, and the basis of damages to
property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are
allowed, as provided in the next preceding section.
No improvements put up·on the property subsequent to the date of service of· summons shall be
included in the assessment of compensation or
damages.
By its separate answer (R. 21-42) the Deere Estate
raised as an issue the necessity for the condemnation,
from an adverse determination of which no appeal is
taken. Defendants also raised therein the dual issues of
first, the extent of the property to be condemned in terms
of "separate parcels" and parts thereof; and secondly, the
time of and extent of the damage resulti;ng fron1 the
taking, for which the State and Federal Constitutions
guaranteed the condemnee "just compensation".
Plaintiff's 1notion to strike the answer was granted
as to all affirmative 1natters therein (R. 21, 43).
(a) More specifically, the answer (R. 12) denied
the State's allegation that the Deere Estate property
consisted of but a single parcel, or "the whole of an
entire parcel". (R. 19.) Defendants in their answer set
forth in detail their contention as to each of the parcels
4
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involved and the fair n1arket values thereof

a~

of .July

12, 1951 (R. ~1-39). The separate answer also set forth
defendants' clain1s for severance da1nages (R. 39-40).
In this connection the applicable portions of Section
104-34-10 of the Judicial
10-!-3±-10.

(_~ode

read as follows:

CoHlJJensati.on and damages -

Ho1i-'

Assessed.
The court, jury or referee n1ust hear such
legal evidence as 1nay be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon n1ust
ascertain and assess:
The value of the property sought to be
conde1nned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists
of different parcels, the value of each pa.rcel and of
each estate or interest therein shall be separately
assessed.
(1)

(2) If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a la.rger parcel, the
dan1ages which 'vill accrue to the portion not
sought to be conde1nned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvernent in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff.

* * *
( 5) As far as practicable compensation must
be assessed for each source of damages separately.
(Chapter 58, Laws of Utah 1951.)
The essential physical facts as to the nature of the
Deere Estate p-roperty-a total of approximately 215.73
acres in the vicinity-are not in dispute. The property is
5
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described in detail in the separate answer (R. 21-42), the
Brayton affidavit (R . .:14-47), the supplemental Brayton
affidavit (R. 68-77); and its characteristics are shown in
the Inaps attached to the separate answer, the court's
order of 11arch 5, 1952 (R. 81-88) and the large maps
which are Exhibits 1 and B. F·or a ready reference defendants suggest use o£ the map found at page 78 of the
record reproduced herein, or that between pages 47 and
48 of the record, which is a workable reduction of the
larger maps.
In barest outline the Deere Estate property north of
Emigration Canyon Road included 21 of a total of 38
platted lots in Oak Hills Plat "A," a recorded residential
subdivision; 41 of a total of 46 lots in the immediately
adjacent unrecorded Oak Hills subdivision; and a 3.96acre area known as I-C. All of these, together with
r_rract I-Da 1nile to the south and completely segregated,
were lu1nped together as "Parcel 1" by the court's order
.of March 5, 1952. (R. 81-88.) Also on the north side of the
canyon were 51 of a total of 55 partially subdivided lots
in an area still further to the north and east knovvn as
I\1 -A; and finally all of the remaining land, largely unimproved or "raw," colored on the maps in brown and blue
and known as areas II and VI. Included on the extreme
east end of Tract VI was the Deere Estate water source
and collecting system, with transmission and distribution
lines extending to the platted lots to the west.
On the south side of Emigration Canyon Road, in
addition to Tract I-D in the extreme southwest corner,
was the remaining "bottom land" alongside Emigration
6
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Canyon strea1n, Area III; a cotnpletely isolated area to
the east, Area ,,.. ; the acreage north of dedicated Kennedy Drive extending to the bro\Y of the plateau; and
finally a part only of the area south of ICennedy Drive,
~eYered

from the balance of the Deere Estate's re1naining

property extending still further to the south by the
straight line boundary of the legislative fiat. The court's
order of :llarch 5, 1952 lun1ped all of this into "Parcel 2",
together with all of those portions on the north side of
E1nigra.tion Canyon not included in "Parcel 1." (R. 81SS and Inap a part of this order, and Ex. B.)
Included with the conden1ned land in addition to the
\Yater systeu1 were various interests in streets, water
rights and other items the details of which are not
involved in this appeal. Some of these interests plaintiff
itself excluded from consideration in the conden1nation
proceeding for various reasons not here involved, and
other~ \Yere excluded by the court but are not involved
in this appeal.

)

J

Rejecting both plaintiff's contention that defendant~'
land consisted of but the single "Parcel 28," and defendants' contention that many separate parcels were involved, the court initially determined on the basis of the
Brayton affidavit and defendants' answer to interrogatories (R. 44-47, 57-58) that defendants' property to be
condemned consisted of these two, and only two "parcels,"
all of each of which was to be condemned with accordingly
no severance damage. (R. 81-88 and map attached to this
order, par. 4 thereof, R. 92.)
7
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An application for an interlocutory appeal fron1 this
crucial order \Yas denied by this court. (Case No. 7839.)
The District Court thereafter consistently adhered
to this Btwo-parcel decision" and its resultant implications "rhen fro111 ti1ne to time issues pertaining thereto
were raised during the further proceedings, such as by
defendants' proposed Instructions 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18
and 20. (R. 100-110.) All evidence as to severance damage
was exc1uded and elirnina ted from consideration by the
jury; e.g., the court refused to give defendants' requested
Instructions Nos. 13, 14 and 16. (R. 105-108.) These defendants duly excepted to the court'·s instructions, which
were given consistently in accordance with its initial
"two-parcel" order, e.g., Instructions 6, 8 and 9. (R. 11211-t). The court rejected all evidence as to lot values,
etc. (R. 95-96.) The water system was lumped in as
part of "Parcel 2." (R. 97-98.)
(b) . AJso alleged in the answer and stricken wa~
defendants' averrnent that under the circumstances of this
case and the application of the special legislative mandate to this particular property, the effective date of taking for all practical purposes, and thus the time of accrual of defendants' constitutional right to damages, wa!
July 12, 1951, the date summons was served; and the damages thus would include not only the fa~r market value
of the property taken as of that date, but also interest
thereon from that date until payment. (R. 40.)
As to this issue, the court likewise continued to
adhere to its early decision that the time of taking of
8
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both title and po8session \Vould not be until entr~' of the
conden1na tion judg1uen t (:\I ay ~7, 1~)5:2) ; the ref ore the
a\vard of just co1npensation should not include interest
frou1 July 1:2, 1~)5:2 until ti1ne of pay1nent. For exa1nple,
a requested instruction to allo\\~ interest was refused
(R. 111); and defendants' n1otion to include such interest
.
.
in the judg1nent on the yerdict (R. 127 -128) was denied.
(R. 1:29.)
Judg1uent on the jury's Yerdict was 1n due course
n1ade and entered l\Iay 10, 1952. (R. 117-126.) Thereafter
plaintiff deposited \Yith the court its draft for the amount
of the jury's verdict and costs. (R. 130.) On May 27, 1952
the court 1nade and entered the usual condemnation judgInent "~hereby plaintiff took title and possession. (R. 131139.)
From both the judgment on the verdict and the final
judg1nent of conden1nation, defendants on June 9, 1952
a ppea.led to this court. (R. 146.)
II.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. The court improperly refused to award defendants as a part of the just compensation to be paid pursuant to state and federal Constitutions not only the fair
Inarket value of defendants' property as of the date taken,
but in addition interest upon that fair market value computed at the legal rate from July 12, 1951 until May 10,
1952, 'vhen the fair market value was determined.
:2.

The court improperly refused to allow these de9
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fendants to cross exantine plaintiff's expert witnesses on
the subject of the actual market values of cornparable
pro1>ertv as of J ulv 12 1951 and likewise excluded evi.
~
'
'
dence as to the actual rnarket values of such cornparable
propertie~.

']~he

court below improperly refused to allo'v appellanh~ to introduce evidence relating to the fair rnarket
Yalue of the Deere Estate water utility system or any part
thereof.
:L

-l-. ri'he COUl't i1nproperly ruled that the property
of appellants under condemnation consisted of the whole
of hut two separate parcels, each to be separately assessed.

5.

The court irnproperly eliminated the Issue of
severance darnages.
III.

ARGUMENT
Point.
The court improperly refused to award defendants
as a part of the just compensation to be paid pursuant to
state and federal Constitutions not only the fair market
value of defendants' property as of the date taken, but in
addition interest upon that fair market value computed at
the legal rate from July 12, 1951 until May 10, 1952, when
that fair market value was determined.
1.

Utah took from the owners the Deere Estate property. when pursuant to specific legislative ma.ndate, summons was served July 12, 1951. Possession as such became worthless the moment the special legislation was
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enacted; certainly not later than the tilne sunnnons was
served. For practical and n1oral purposes this had actually occurred 'vhen Chapter 13 beca1ne effective June 18,
1951, for the owners could hardly continue their developInent operations in the light of an inevitable acquisition
by the State.
K ot only "~as there no value to the ternporarily extended bare right of possession of this property which
could no longer be sold, improved, developed or used.
Actually it was a burden, for defendants were required
to continue operation of its pumps to keep the water systenl fron1 freezing. ''rhen defendants called up plaintiff's
n1otion for occupancy, the plaintiff resisted its own motion. ( R. S2.) Yet the court below refused to permit proof
of the obvious facts -sho,ving the deprivation of defendants' property, and struck defendants' averments in their
answer 'Yith respect thereto. (R. 21, 42.)

Article I of Utah's Constitution reads in part as follows:
S.ec. 7.

(Due process of la.w.)

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Sec. 22.

(Private property for p·ublic use.)

Private property shall not be taken or danlages for public use without just compensation.
Likewise, payment of "just compensation" is required
of the State of Utah by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, the test being the same as is required of the Federal Government itself under the Fifth
11
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An1end1nent. For exan1ple, see Orgel on Valuation under
J~J1ninent Do1nain, Section 5, page 17, wherein it is said:
'"~ince the Fourteenth Antendrnent of the

Federal Constitution is binding on every state,
this requireu1ent (of just con1pensation) deterInines the minimum basis of compensation
throughout the entire United States."
The United States Suprerne Court has phrased "just
contpensation" to be "the full and perfect equivalent of
the property taken." Without elaborating principles now
so fundamental a part of the law of eminent domain, we
invite attention to the following key cases:
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR. Co. v.
Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 s. Ct. 581;
Ettor v. Tacorna,
228 U.S. 148, 57 L. ed 733, 33 S. Ct. -t-28;
McCoy v. Union Elevated RR. Co.,
24 7 U.S. 354, 62 L. ed. 1158, 38 R. Ct. 504;
Bragg v. \Veaver,
251 U.S. 57, 64 L. ed. 135, 40 S. Ct. 62;
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co. v.
Morristown,
276 U.S. 182, 72 L. ed. 523, -±R S. Ct. 276;
Olson v. United States,
292 U.S. 246, 7S L. ed. 1236, 54 S. Ct. 704;
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 299, 30-t, 306, 43 S. Ct. 354, 256,
67 L. ed. 664.
Allowance of interest pursuant to the overriding constitutional provisions is implied in the absence of express
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~tatutory

authorization of such. Other,Yi~P the eondeinnation legi~lation "·ould Yiolate the federal and usually
also the applicable ~tate constitutional provisions. SiinInons Y. J)illon, (\\r. \Ta.) l~l;i ~.E. 331, ll;J 1\.L.H. 7H7.
Thn~

in the Seaboard Air Line case cited above, the
court held:
·~The

eornpensation to \Yhich the owner is entitled i~ the full and perfect equivalent of the proverty taken. ~lonongahela Nav. Co. v. linited
States, (supra) 1-lS lT. S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 622, 37 L.
Ed. 4G3. It rests on equitable principles and it
1neans substantially that the owner shall be put in
a~ good position pecuniarily as he would have been
i.f his property had not been taken. (Citing cases.)
He is entitled to the darnages inflicted by the takIng ...
.. ,,~here the l-:-nited States condemns and take~
lH)~~es~ion of land before ascertaining or paying
eou1pen~a tion, the owner is not limited to the value
of the property at the time of the taking; he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with
the taking. Interest at a proper rate is a good
1uea~ure by 'vhich to ascertain the a1nount so to be
added. The legal rate of interest, as established
by the South Carolina statute was applied in this
case. This was a "palpably fair and reasonable
method of performing the indispensable condition
to the exercise of the right of eminent domain,
narnely, of making "just compensation" for the
land as it stands, at the time of taking.' ...
uThe addition of interest allowed by the Di:strict Court is necessary in order that the owner
:;;hall not suffer loss and shall have 'just compensa-
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tion' to 'vhich he is entitled."
Again in Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265
U.S. 106, 44 s. Ct. 471, 68 L. ed. 934, the court said:
"'And, if the taking precedes the payment of
co1npensation, the owner is entitled to such addition to the value at the ti1ne of the taking as will
produce the full equivalent of such value paid contemporaneously. Interest at a 1Jroper rate is a
good measure of the amount to be added." (Italics
ours.)
The same rule was applied in United States v. Rogers,
255 U.S. 163, 41 S. Ct. 281,65 L. ed. 566.
The Utah statute is of course silent with respect to
any allowance of interest, thus requiring application of
the foregoing rule.
Utah's condemnation statutes which implement these
constitutional minimum requirements are neither unique
nor unusual. Section 104-34-10 provides for the determination of the value of the property taken, and lays down
rules for determination of that value. The section following then provides that "the right thereto shall be deemed
to have accrued" to that value and is to be measured ae
of the date of service of summons. Counterparts of these
provisions are found in California, Deering's 1941 Civil
Code, ~§ 1249, 1254; in the Idaho Code, ~~ 7-712 and 7-717;
and in Montana Revised Codes 1935, §§ 9945 and 9952.
(a) On facts such as are here present, payment of
interest is required.

On facts similar to those pertaining to the Deere Es-
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tate property, and applying the identical Idaho statute
to a en~e where a large tract of land was condemned for
purposes connected \Yi th the . :\1uerican F·alls Reservoir>
the Federal District ("ourt ~quarely held that to the
a\Yard of the fair 1uarket value as of the date ~n1nn1ons
"~as ~erYed should be added interest. United States v.
Bro,vn, ~~~)F. lt)S. On cross \Vrit of error fron1 the award
of interest, the United States Supreine Court affirmed.
Brown Y. lTnited States, :263 lT.S. 78, 68 L. ed. 171. The
court in part said:
~~The

district court, in directing the jury, follo,ved the la"~ of the state (Idaho Con1p. Laws
1919, § 7-± 15 ; Idaho Rev. Codes 1908, § 5221) in
which the land lay and the court was sitting, as follO\\Ts:
·~For the purpose of assessing con1pensation
and da1nages, the right thereto shall be deemed to
have accrued at the date of the summons, and its
actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of
compensation for all property to be actually taken .

. . . No improvements put upon the property subsequent to the date of the service of summons shall
be included in the assessment of compensation or
da1nages."
"'The Idaho statute has been construed by the
circuit court of appeals of the ninth circuit to
justify the court in adding interest upon the value
fixed by the jury from the date of the summons
until the judgment. Weiser Valley Land & Water
Co. v. Ryan, 111 C.C.A. 221, 190 Fed. 417, 424. The
court said:
"Having such right ·to compensation at a
given time, it would seem that the owner ought to
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ha\-e interest on the arnount ascertained until paid.
In the 1neanwhile he can claim nothing for added
inllH'OYelnents nor is he entitled to any advance
' the value of the property. ''
that n1ight affect
•'* ·~

* It often happens that in the delays intident to conden1nation suits the loss to the o\\-ner
arising fron1 the delay between the sum1nons and
the vesting of title by judgment is a serious one.
rrhe interest charge under the Idaho statute has
the wholesorne effect of stimulating the plaintiff in
condemnation to proinpt action. Moreover, the
plaintiff 1nay reduce to a 1ninimum the rents and
profits enjoyed by the defendant, because, under
the Idaho statute, the plaintiff 1nay have a sulnInary preliminary hearing before commissioners to
fix probable damages, and by depositing the
a1nount so fixed with the clerk of the court, i_f the
defendant 'viii not accept it, the plaintiff 1nay obtain irnmediate possession. Within less than a
1nonth after bringing suit, he can thus appropriate
to himself the rents and profits of the land, and
in enjoyn1ent of them can await the final judgn1ent.
2 Idaho Co1np. ·stat. 1919, § 7420; 2 Idaho Rev.
Codes 1908, § 5226."

A concise staternent of the rule in such cases is found
in Duncan-Hood Corporation v. City of Summit, (N.~J.),
146 Atl. 182, wherein the court states:
~·The

final ground for reversal urged is that
the trial court added to the verdicts, as returned
by the jury, interest fron1 the date of the adoption
of the ordinance to the date of rendering the Yrrdicts.
.
"This was not error. As before indicated the
. taking of the lands of respondents was as of' and
fron1 the date the ordinance in question became
16
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effectiYe ...A.t that date the dantag-e, if any, to re~pondent~ aro~e and arerued, and the~· \verP entitled to he con1pen~ated a~ of tl1at date. ~nch
con1pensation lu.1Ying been "·ithlH_\ld, thP:~ ,,·erP (~n
titled to the a111ount thereof, together \Yith interP~t
for the forbearance.
For the reason~ herein set forth, the jndgInents under reYie"'" are reYer~ed, and a venire de
novo awarded.
H

··For affirmanee: None.
··For reversal: The CHANCELLOR, the
CHIEF Jl"'"STICE, Justices TRENCHARD,
PARKER, CAl\iPBELL, LLOYD, and CASE,
and Judges \~AN BlTSI{IRK, ~IeGLENNON,
l(.A. YS, HETFIELD, and DEAR."
To these unanimous decisions of the federal district,
~.ircuit and ~upreme courts involving the identical statutor~~ provisions applied to facts similar to those in this
ease, and to the opinion of the highest of the New Jersey
court:', ":-e add the opinion of the Michigan Supren1e Court
in an analogous situation. Campau v. City of Detroit, 196
N.,~v. 5:27, 32 A.L.R. 91. Here also land for a pToposed
public park \Yas involved, to be condemned under a procedure \vherein the City had one years' time within which
to pay the award after it should be confirmed and thus
becon1e final. Confirmation corresponded in the present
ea~e to the date of the passage of Chapter 13, or at most
the date of service of summons, at which time the injury
and da1nages to the Deere Estate became fixed by virtue
of the legislative mandate.
ln the 1\fichigan case the owner claimed interest be-
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tween the date of "'taking," and the date of actual payment of the award. As here, the condemnor tendered
the award without such interest which the owner refused

'

to accept in full settlement. During the interim, as here,
the owner continued in possession, and the or~inance was
silent as to interest.
Interest was allowed, in view of the Federal Constitution and the similar provisions of the Michigan Constitution.
With the exception of the foregoing decisions directly
or by analogy in point, we have found no other applicable
determinations by courts of other jurisdictions. The reason is obvious, for almost invariably the taking in condemnation proceedings coincides with payment, or at a least
payment occurs within a .reasonable time of the determination of the amount of compensation due. However, general discussions and annotations on the allowability of interest, even though the owner remains in possession, may
be found in connection with the Brown case at 68 L. ed.
171 ; in 96 ·A.L.R. 196, supplemented at 111 A.L.R. 1306,
paragraphs VIII (b) ; 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3d ed.,
§ 742, p. 1319; Orgel's Valuation under Eminent Domain,
§ 5, p. 17; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain,§ 275; and 29
C.J.S., Eminent Domain,§ 176, where it is noted on page
1054 that "the 1nere fact of delay in ·bringing to a hearing
the determination of da1nage does not defeat the owner's
right to interest."
It is respectfully submitted that justice, logic and
reason support the authorities above which wnder· the
18
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facL..,· of this particular case hold that the taking of the
O\\yner'~ property and the injury and da1nage to thP Deere
}~~tate here occurred June 18, 1951, or at lea~t by J·uly
12, 1951 ~ and that accordingly intere~t ~ubsequent to that
date should be nllo,ved as a part of the just co1npensation
to 1nake the O\Yner "Thole. \\. . ith respect to the wisdon1 of
the action taken by unequiYocal n1andate of Utah's legi:-;la ture, "ye are not here concerned.
(b)

Utah is in accord.

This Court in the case of F·ell v. Union Pacific l{R.
Co., 3~ l:tah 101, 88 P. 1003, 28 L.R.A. 1, reviewed extensively the reason for the allowance of interest, sulnInarizing a~ follo,vs:
··The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before judgment in a
given case or not is, therefore, not whether the
da1nages are unliquidated or otherwise, but
\Yhether the injury and consequent damages are
co1nplete and must be ascertained ·as of a particular tiine and in accordance with fixed rules of
e·vidence and known standards of value, which the
court or jury must follow in fixing the amount,
rather than be guided by their best judgment in assessing the an1ount to be allowed for past as well
a~ for future injury, or for elements that cannot
he 1neasured by any fixed standards of value.

* * *''
Here it will be noted that the three factors of the
"true test" were each present:

a.

The injury and consequent damage to the Deere

19
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Estate were con1plete June 18, 1951, or certainly when
summons was served July 12, 1951;
b.

Dan1ages 'vere to be deterrnined as of that par-

ticular time ; and
c.

Dan1ages were to be determined 1n accordance

with fixed rules of evidence.
Of course where there has be.en no damage and hence
the taking does not occur until the final condemnation
judgment, the tests outlined above are not met. Thus this
court has held that where the owners remain in continued
enjoyment of the property with no impairrnent as to its
use, there is no right to interest because there has been no
loss to be compensated. Such cases stand on their own
facts, e.g., Oregon Short Line RR. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah
147, 80 P. 732, and Salt Lake & Utah RR. Co. v. Schramm,
56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90. Here, we again reiterate, under the
facts of the peculiar legislative mandate and the applicable general statutes the Deere Estate was just as effectively deprived of its property June 18, 1951 or at least
by July 12, 1951 as if the State of Utah had then physically obtained possession. The injury and the damage
were then complete and the only thing remaining was to
determine the extent ·of that damage in accordance with
the fixed rules of evidence and the proceedings applicable to conden1nation cases.
That no actual physical taking at all is necessary
was the holding in the case of State v. F'ourth Judicial
District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502, the court dividing,
20
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ho,veyer,

a~

eon~tituted

_Ho"~

the

to ''"hether the facts in the partieular easP

a taking.

different the

~upre1ne

faet~

here, 'vhere to quote fro1n

courts of Connecticut and Minnesota, the

o'vner, effective at least by July 1:2, 1951, was "practically
depriYed of his right to dispose of the land. !lis possession is precarious, liable to be ter1ninated at any ti1ne; he
cannot safely rent; he cannot safely in1prove; if he sows,
he cannot be sure that he will reap." Clark v. Cox,
(Conn.) 5t) _Atl. ~d 512; \\"'" arren v. Railroad, 21 Minn. 424,
-!27.
Fron1 the facts in this case it is obvious that possession by the Deere Estate became worse than valueless
June 18, 1951 or certainly when summons was served.
Not only could the estate for practical purposes neither
dispose of, rent, improve, or far1n the land; the owner
had to terminate the various improvement contracts and
then continue to maintain the utility pumps to avoid extensive damage to the water system without compensation
until the State eventually should conclude the act directed "forthwith" by the legislature, by inevitably taking legal title and possession.
(c)

A new trial is not required.

Mathematically, the interest on the fair market value
of the defendants' property between the date of the injury and the time when the amount of the award was determined can readily be computed. At six per cent it
a1nounts to $24,799.32 for the period July 12, 1951 until
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~fay

10, 1952.

This amount the court below could and should have
included in the judgment on the verdict, no jury question
being involved. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Oliver (Okla.),
87 P. 423, 2 Lewis on Eminent Dornain, ~ 742 at page 1324.
This error can be corrected by simple direction of
this court, no new trial or resubmission to the jury being
required.
Thus in Reed v. Chicago, Mil~aukee & St. Paul RR.
Co. (C.C.), 25 F. 886, Mr. Justice 'Shiras said:
"Until the verdict is rendered it cannot be
known whether plaintiff may be entitled to interest. When this is determined by the amount of
the verdict, the court can then n1ake the proper
order, and the same will form part of the adjudication, settling damages."
Accordingly on appeal the Circuit Court determined the
amount of interest to which plaintiff was entitled, added
this to the amount of the verdict as returned by the jury,
and rendered judgment for the aggregate amount.
Again, the case of Alloway v. N ashvill~, 88 Tenn. 510,
13 S.W. 123, 8 L.R.A. 123, was a condemnation proceeding. No instruction as to interest was given or requested
and none was allowed by the jury. Before judgment was
rendered Alloway moved the court to add interest, as
the defendants did here for the Deere Estate; and there
also the motion was rejected and on appeal such refusal
was assigned as error. The Supreme Court said:
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to add intt1rest \Vas error. * =~ *
the t1ITor ean be readily corrected
here, that \\"ill be donP, instead of reversing and
re1uanding. l'his eourt "Till render the judgtnen t
that should have heen rendered below."
·'Refu~al
Ina~nnuch as

Ree also '': arren v. 8t. Paul & Pacific RR. ( 0., ~1
.Jiinn. -1:2-!., and \Y.hiteacre v. 8t. Paul & Sioux RR. Co.,
2-l ~linn. 311, \Yhere the sa1ne practice is approved by the
~Iinnesota Supretne Court; and also 3 Elliott on Railroads, p. 1457, and 18 Am. Jur., Sec. 277.
1

Finally, although the cases and authorities are nuuterous enunciating the principle, we refer to the recent
opinion of this court in Morris v. Russell, 236 P. 2d 451,
'vhere the same rule \Vas invoked. References thereir1
were made to decisions in Oklahoma, Texas, Kentucky>
Illinois, and to another recent decision of this court in
Simmons v. Wilkin, 80 Utah 362, 15 P. 2d 321.
Point.
The court improperly refused to allow these defendants to cross examine plaintiff's expert witnesses on the
subject of the actual market values of comparable property
as of July 12, 1951, and likewise excluded direct evidence as
to the actual market values of such comparable properties.
2.

Plaintiff's witnesses all had had extensive experience and were familiar with the property under condemnation, as well as comparable properties and their
market values. They were each permitted accordingly to
express their opinion as to the fair market value of the
two parcels. For example, reference is made to. the·testilnony of Witness Edward ::vr. Ashton in this respect.
(S.R. 29-37.)
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On cross examination (he court below absolutely
excluded defendant from testing the experts' opinions
on the basis of the market values of such comparable
lands. For exa1nple, Witness Ashton was asked with
respect to the adjacent Indian Hills Subdivision, and
objections to such line of questioning were sustained.
MR. BEHLE : I assume, for the record, I am
foreclosed in testing this witness in respect to
con1parative values on any basis; front foot, ·acreage, per lot, as well as asking him in regard to his
subdivision~

THE C01TRT: Well, you may, unless there
is objection, proceed the same with him as you
did with Mr. Kiepe. Is that what you mean~
MR. BEHLE: Well, I thought the rulings
cut n1e off from any of that so I wanted to be sure.
In other words, I understand I can't ask the witness \vhat land in the vicinity comparable to this
land sells for, either by an acre basis or a front
foot basis, or a lot basis, is that correct~
THE COURT: Well, yes. I ruled against
you on that with Mr. Kiepe and I would do the
same with Mr. Ashton.

l\1R. BEHLE : Yes, sure. In other words, I
can't test on comparative sales, on comparative
sales prices~
THE COURT: That is correct. You cannot.
( S.R. 40-41.)
It will also be readily remembered that a large portion of the Deere Estate lands consisted of subdivided
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

residential lots, 1nore tha.n twenty of which had been
sold to individual purchasers on the open Inarket to
other defendant~ in the conden1nation proceeding·. Yet
the court belo\\" absolutely excluded direct evidence or
cross exan1ina tion as to lot or acreage values of property
cotnparable to either the lots or acreage of the J)eere

Estate.
MR. BEHLE : If the Court please, I think
the record is clear on our proffer of proof of
comparable values. I think the door has been
closed on us every tin1e \Ve have tried to prove
and test values, and here is a specific instance.

THE COURT: Well, the only reason that the
door is closed to you is that the law provides
that you shall not do that and I try to follow
what the law is. I am not trying to close any
door on you and if you have any doubt about it
I can show yon the authorities on the value of a
place. Well, that case Mr. Budge had the other
day covers that subject. It has not been permitted
and you persist in it and it is against the law.

MR. BEHLE: Well, of course, that is one
of the arguments \Ve have been having right
along.
THE COURT: 'Veil, that is right. Of course
I have heen ruling; against you because I hav<_)
been ruling it is not lawful for you to divide thi~
property into lots, nor the price per lot, or any
other p-roperty into lots or the values of then1.
( S.R. -±2-43.)

* * *
MR. BEHLE : We also specifically tender
proof with respect to Indian Village as a corn25
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parable subdivision purchased on an acreage basis
as raw acreage and the value per acre- of $7,500.00
shortlY before the date of condemnation and the
chara~teristics of that area as being comparable.

MR. BUDGE: Same objection.
THE COlJRT: The objection is sustained.
MR. BEHLE: For the record only we again
1nake a tender in connection with lot sales and
prices.
l\iR. BUDGE: Same objection.
THE COURT: Within the area being conden1ned ~
~11~.

BEHLE: Within the area and comparable to the area.

MR. BUDGE: Same objeetion.
THE COURT: The objection 1s sustained.
(S.R. 52.)
We would have thought it clear that the best evidence of the market value of land, or for that matter
ahnost any tangible property with a market value, would
be the actual figures as to which that or comparable
property \vas selling for on the open market at about
the time of the valuation. 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain,
Ch. XXI. Certainly that is how one proves the value of
stocks active on the market, or one's automobile, o1·
home.
But here all such evidence was completely excluded
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-\vhether on a front-foot lot or aerpa o·e basis-under
'

'

b

a sweeping ruling by the court that all such evidence
\vas unproper.
This court, in keeping \Yi th the l\la~~ae h U8etts doetrine or weight of opinion, is cited b~T Niehol~ ( § :21.3)
as in accord \Vith the \Yeight of opinion that such evidence
is adrnissible. Telluride Po-\ver Co. v. Bruneau, .fl l Ttah
4, 125 P. 399.
The result of Judge \""an Cott's ruling, which extended also to cross examination, was to leave before
the jury a naked opinion as to the value of two parcels
only, and for practical purposes to cut off and restrict
inquiry into just how such dollar figures were reached
by the testifying experts.
Defendants respectfully sub1nit such errors requrre
reversal for the reasons so well expressed in St. Louis,
etc. RR. Co. v. Clark (Mo.), 25 s. W. 192, 26 L.R.A. 751,
as follo,vs:
We think the evidence of sales of sirnilar
property to that in question, made in the neighborhood, about the same time, was adnrissible to aid
the jury in de-termining the darnage to which the
owner was entitled. The value of property is
ascertained largely frorn such sales, and the
opinions of witnesses as to values are. largely
predicated upon thern. It is best, when it can be
done, to put the jurors in possession of all the
facts from which values are ascertained, and allow
them to draw the conclusion therefrorn. Witnesses
basing their opinion upon recent sales of like
property are liable to exaggerate or underesti27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1nate values; in any c-onsideration they are no
n1ore capable of deducing fair conclusi~ns ~ro1n
the known facts than the jury. The obJect IS to
ascertain the general 1narket value,_ and i_f particular sales are made under exceptional c1rcun1stances the fact can be shown, and the jury can
determine its probative force. Certainly no more
reliable method of determining the fair ma.rket
values of lands can be reached than that derived
fran~ bona fide . sales of ·"'·irnilar lands in tlze
vicinity. The objection that such evidence raises
collateral issues as to the character of the land
sold, and the circumstances of such sales, is 1nore
than compensated for by its value in aiding the
jury to a correct conclusion. (Italics ours.)
Point.
3. The court below improperly ·refused to allow appellants to introduce evidence relating to the fair market value
of the Deere Estate water utility system or any part thereof.

To prove the value of the Deere Estate water utility
systen1, defendants called as an expert witness Engineer C. J. Ullrich, who was inti1nately farniliar 'vith
and exceptionally well qualified to express an opinion
as to the value of that water syste1n. This system consi~ted of a series of springs, an extensive collection and
t-~torage ~ystem including dual electric pumps and two
large storage tanks, transmission lines to the various
points of use throughout the area under condemnation,
and then finally distribution lines into the residential
areas and other points of use. The witness described
the systen1 in detail and testified that as an integrated
water utility it had been planned for immediate use in
the general Oak Hills area and for ultimate use else2b
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,,~here
\\~ith

after 1952, when Oak Hills was to be connected

the Salt Lake City n1unicipal water systen1. Ohjee-

tions \Yere sustained to all questions with respect to the
value Of that \Yater systenl Or Of any part thereof.
( S.R. 9-14.) .A. tender of proof was rejected as to the
fair 1narket value of that water system (exclusive of
land rights) being $7-!,200.00, assignable $10,500.00 to
the \Yater rights and $63,700.00 to the balance of the
systen1, of 'vhich $~5,700.00 '"·as allocated to that part
of the distribution ~ysten1 \Yithin the streets of l~arcel
I, these being the fair n1arket values as of July 15, 1951.
(S.R. 16.)
X o reason \\~as assigned for this exclusion, \\'hich
~eeu1s beyond comprehension when the general rule is
that such a utility not only may but must be valued by
\Yitnesses who have ~'some peculiar means of for1ning
an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value of
the property in question." Thus it is said that the valuation by utility experts is "ahnost mandatory in all cases
since it is obvious that values cannot be based in such
cases on sales or on values at which such property is
held in the vicinity." 5 Nichols on Eminent Don1ain,
~ 1~..4-7.

Yet not only did the eourt exclude the op1n1on of
the only expert on water utility values; it perntitted
lay real estate men to lump the utility's value in with
the land on the basis of indefinite hearsay discussjons
''with the engineers in the City Water Department, the
1uost logical buyers." ( S.R. 45.) It violated Sec. 104-34-10.
29
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Point.
4. The court improperly ruled that the property of
appellants under condemnation consisted of the whole of but
two separate parcels, each to be separately assessed.

a.

The Statutory Mandate:

As a matter of right, an owner whose property is
conde1nned is entitled under Utah law to a separate
as.~.,·essment

for each different parcel of his land that is

taken. He is also entitled as a matter of right to an
award for any net. severance damages where there is
only a partial taking, in addition to the value of the
part taken. The policy laid down by Utah's legislature
is to assess separately for each source of damages as
far as practical.
104-34-10.. Compensation and damages-How

Assessed.
The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess :
(1) The value of the property sought to be
condemned and all improve1nents thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists of d~fferent parcels, the value of each parcel
and of each estate or interest therein shall be
separately assessed.

If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the
damages which will accrue to the portion' not
(2)
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sought to be condeu1ned by reason of it~ severance fron1 the portion sought to be eondeinned
and the eonstruction of the improve1uent in the
uu1nner proposed by the plaintiff.
* * ~
( 5) ..A. s far as practieable coinpen8a tion Illust
be assessed for each source of drunages separately.
(Ch. S, La""s of lTtah 1951). (Italics ours.)
. A.s pointed out in the opinions in the case of State
v. Fourth District Court, 7~ 1). 2d 502, 94 Utah 384, the

extent and Ineasure of dainages under Utah law goes
beyond strict constitutional guaranties ; and aJ though
these provisions have been on the statute books of Utah,
California, ~Iontana and Idaho, among other states, for
1nany decades, their mandate is so clear and unequivocal
that there haYe been few cases with respect thereto, especially in recent times.
b.

What Constitutes a "Separate Parcel":

Decision as to what constitutes a separate parcel to
be separately assessed is ordinarily a question of la'v
for the court to determine, since the determinative physical facts are generally not in dispute. But if there is
a·conflict as to these facts, a question of fact is presented
for determination by the jury or court, as the case may
be. 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.) § 701; St. Paul
& Sioux City RR. Co. v. Murphy, 19 Minn. 500.
The three criteria in determining what constitutes
a separate parcel within the meaning of the Utah Statute
seem to be (1) com1non ownership, (2) physical contig.uity, and (3) common use. All three factors usually must
31
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be present, and as stated in Lewis,§ 698:
"In general it is so much as belongs to the
sa1ne proprietor as that taken, and is continuous
with it and used together for a com1non purpose."
In the case of the Deere Estate, on the basis of the
issue~ dra\vn and the record before the court there was
no question a~ to ownership; the factors in question
W'ere those as to contiguity and common use. The evidenee \Ya~ not in conflict, as we see it, and thus the matter
became a question of law. But before looking to the
various parts of the entire tract taken of more than
thirteen c-ity blocks-roughly, an area equivalent to that
between North. Ternple and 8th South, and from State
Street to \\Test Temple Street, let us review further
the authorities.
I1ewi~
~tates

at Section 699, discussing residential areas,
(italics ours):
If t\vo or 1nore contiguous city or village
lot~ are improved and used as one tract, and
any part of an~T one is taken, the owner may
recover the da1nage to all; so, where a tract is
subdivided into lots and blocks, but continues to
be used as before for agricultural purposes, the
subdivision being a mere paper one. In the last
case it is intin1ated that a different rule might
prevail if the lots were merely held for sale.
Contiguous lots improved for separate use are
not one tract. * * * Where a block is divided. by a
street, the parts become distinct tracts as to each
other where they are merely held for sale or use
as building lots. It is held that the subdivision
of land into lots, makes each lot, prima facie, a
32
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separate and distinct tract, and if the o\vner
claims damages to all or n1ore than the lot taken,
he n1ust produce evidence to overcome this presumption. The true rule would seeu1 to he that
lots and blocks hnproved or used for a eonunon
purpose should be regarded as one tract, though
divided by a street or alley; tha.t contigu.ous lots
in the sa1ne block or square sho·uld be reqa rrled
as one tract, though vacant and held for ~ale or
speculation; that lots ilnproved for separa.te use
should in general be regarded a.s sepaTafe tracts:
but that if contiguous lots devoted to a separate
use are more valuable for a conunon use they
1night properly be regarded as one tract ; and that
racant lots and blocks, held for sale or speculation
and separated by streets or alleys should be regarded as distinct tracts.
The foregoing text is amply annotated by cases from
various jurisdictions. The statements are substantially
the same as those found in other standard works. For
example, it is. said in 18 Am. Jur. "Eminent Domain",
Sec. 270:

* * *In determining what constitutes a ~ep
arate and independent parcel of land, when the
property is actually used and occupied, unity of
use is the principal test, and if a tract ·of land,
no part of which is taken, is used in conneetion
with the sarne farm, or the ~au1e 1nanufacturing
establishment, or the sa1ne enterprise of any other
character as the tract, part of which was taken, it
is not considered a separate and independent parcel merely because it was bought at a different
time, and separated by an i1naginary line, or even
if the two tracts are separated by a highway,
railroad or canal. * * *
* * *
When parts of the same establishment are
33
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separated hy intervening private land, they are
eonsidered as independent parcels, unless they
are so inseparably connected in the use to which
they are applied that the injury or destr~c~ion
of one rnust necessarily and permanently InJure
the other. So also, contiguous tracts owned by
the same person, but used for different purposes
and rented to different tenants, should be considered as separate tracts. If both are injured
by the taking, it is proper to permit the jury to
consider the reasonable market value of each
tract. Even if two tracts are contiguous and
owned by the same owner and used for the same
purpose, if they are not used in connection with
each other, they must be considered as separate
tracts, as, for example, a block of city houses
rented to different tenants for residential purposes. Vacant and unoccupied land is considered
to be separated into independent parcels by a
public street, whatever the intention of the owner
in regard to future use. A mere platting into
blocks and lots has been held sufficient in the case
of vacant land to show, prima facie, at least, a
division in to separate and independent parcels;
although as to this there is authority to the contrary.
See also Corpus Juris, Eminent Domain, Section 395;
the annotation in 57 L.R.A. 937, at page 940; and the
cases and comment in 2 American Railroad & Corporation
Reports 184.
Somewhat the same problem is presented in connection with the requirements that real prop·erty be
assessed for ad valorem tax purposes by "parcels or
subdivisions not exceeding six hundre4 forty acres each
* * * " l 1 tah Code, §80-5-8. The following case applies
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the rule quoted above in conneetion \vith such tax stat-

utes:
Generally, ~everal lots in the sa1ne bloek,
contiguous to each other and O\vned by the ~a1ne
person, are deerned one ~'parcel" of land \Vithin
eonten1plation of statute requiring full cash value
of each Hparcel" of land attached to be set do\rn
in assess1nent roll. Code 1930, ~ 69-24:2, subd. 4.
Guthrie v. Haun, Or., 76 P. :2d ~9:2, 29-!.
The san1e problem also is presented where in utortgage or execution ~ales, and in order to realize a higher
arnount for the debtor, real property consisting of several
kno-w-n lots or '·parcels" is to be sold "separately and not
as a unit."
The recent l 1 tah case of Conunercial Bank v. l\1adsen,
236 P. 2d 343, again applies the same rule set forth above
as to conde1nnation and tax assessment. In that case two
contiguous lots owned by the same debtor and in use as a
·~unified parcel" \Yere held to be the proper subject of a
single sale. In that case, as the court pointed out,The bank prepared and accepted a mortgage
of this property as one parcel; in its pleadings,
judgment, notice of sale and throughout the entire
proceeding it was treated by the bank as one
parcel of property. The sheriff and two other \vitnesses all testified that they considered the land
as a single parcel of property. The judgment
debtor testified to the effect that he did not object
to the sale as a unit and that he had no reason to
think more money could be raised if the lots \vere
sold separately. The fact that the land is described
as "Lots 1 and 2 of block 28, Plat A l\{anti CitY
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Survey" does not serve to rnake separate tracts
of an 'otherwise unified parcel. For a discussion
to the effect that description of property by lots
does not serve to make it separate parcels, see:
33 C.J.S.. , Executions, ~ 210, p. 449.
Finally, we quote from \T olume 4 of Nichols' work
on Eminent Domain, the third edition of which has just
been published:
~

14.31.

What constitutes a separate parcel.

Diff-icult ques6ons sometirnes arise in detern1ining what constitutes a separate or independent
parcel or tract of land. · There are a few definite
r1tles of law that can be laid down. In many cases
the court can, as a rnatter of law, determine that
lots are distinct or otherwise, but ordinarily it is
a practica-l question to be decided by the jury or
other similar tribunal which passes upon 1natters
of fact, which should consider evidence on the use
and appearance of the land, its legal divisions
and the intent of its owner and conclude whether
on the 'vhole the lots are separate or not. In such
cases the land itself rather than the map should
~be looked at, and one part of a parcel is not to be
considered separate and independent merely because it was bought at a different time from the
rest and is separated from it by an imaginary line.
( 1)

Physical contiguity.

Actual contiguity between two separate pareels is ordinarily essential to merit consideration
as a unified tract. Actual physical separation by
an intervening space between two parcels belonging to the same owner is ordinarily ground for
holding that the parcels are to be treated as independent of each other, but it is not necessarily a
36
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conclusive test. If the land is actually oeeu pilld
or in use the unity of the use i~ the chief criterion.
\\'""hen t\Yo pareel~ are ph~·~ieally distinet there
n1u~t he ~uch a conneetion or relation of adaptation, convenience and actual and peru1anent use
as to Inake the enjoyrnent of one reasonably neeessary to the enjoy1nent of the other in the 1nost
advantageous 1nanner in the business for \vhich
it is used, to constitute a single parcel -vvithin
the 1neaning of the rule. Accordingly, a public
high,vay actually wrought and travelled, a railroad, a canal, or a creek running through a large
tract devoted to one purpose does not necessarily
divide it into independent parcels, provided the
. owner has the legal right to cross th~ intervening
strip of land or ""ater. But a public highway will
ordinarily divide the land of a single owner into
separate parcels, even if both parcels a.re used for
the sanze purpose, if the use upon each parcel
is ~eparate and independent of that up-on the other.
* * *
vVhen land is unoccupied and so not devpted
to use of any character, and especially rzrhcn 'lt
is held for purposes of sale in building lots, a
physical division by wrought roads and streets
creates independent zJarcels as a ma.tter of lau·.
* * * (Italics our~.)
c. Appellants have not Waived their Right for Separate Assessments.

Throughout the trial and also by its application to
this court for an interlocutory appeal, ap.pellants asserted their right to separate assessments for each parcel.
Thus the right has not been waived, as did occur in Idaho
under an identical statute where likewise a large area
of land was condemned for reservoir purposes. In the
37
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case of Big Lost River Irr. Co. v. Davidson (Ida.), 121.
P. 88, 92, it was said:
Under the prov1s1ons of the statute it was
not necessary that the jury should find the value
of each legal subdivision of the tract sought to
be conden1ned. If, however, there is n1ore than
one parcel of land, or several separate parcels
or tracts, each separated from the other, then
it is necessary for the jury to determine the valur:
of each separate tract or parcel. But where the
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value
then rnay be fixed as a single parcel or tract.
"Parcel" or "tract" of land as used in this sec'
tion, does not mean legal subdivision,
but a consolidated body of land, and the finding of the
jury may be upon each single parcel or tract of
land.
* * *
d.

The

P~hysical

Facts in this Case :

.r\_pplying the foregoing law to the physical facts of
the Deere Estate, we find that in the tract-more than
thirteen large city blocks in area-there are not only
recorded plats of lots and blocks, and the actual physical
i1nprovements constituting a subdivision, namely, streets,
curh and gutter, drainage, fire hydrants, utilities, ete.
Here vve have further physical barriers such as mountain
strearns and the steep slopes and cliffs of Emigration
Canyon. Sections of the Deere Estate property are more
than a mile apart. Specifically:
There is an area of 50.60 acres described on
the map as Tracts II, IV-C and VI, which is essentially
hillside land. As to this area there are the required
(1)
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requisites pf eounuon o"·nership, use and contiguity.
In connection 'vith this area \vill be involved the value
r_rogether this WOUld
the ":--ater utility
(2)

COll~titute

~y~ten1

one .. parcel",

tllP

land and

to be each sPpara tely assessed.

There is an area of 5.81 acres known as Tract

\"'" \vhich is con1pletely segregated fron1 the other property
O\\'lled by these defendants and wherein there is both
common O\vnership and use. This area is Inore than half
the size of Ten1ple Square, and is a separate "parcel."
( 3) There is a third separate parcel of 7.35 acres
known as Tract III which has been developed and is zoned
for connnercial purposes. It is segregated froin other
areas by other ownerships on the east, by the state and
county roads on the north and west, and by Emigration
Canyon and Creek on the south.
(4) South of Emigration Creek Canyon are Tracts
I-D and I\T-B, each of which is divided roughly east and
west by a dedicated street-Kennedy Drive.
(a) Tract. I-D consists of a total of 6. 65 acres.
Of this, 1.5 acres is in the extreu1e south-vvest corner of the
entire tract to be condemned. Obviously severance daHlages are involved. The same situation pertains to the
south part of Tract ry··-B. This consists of 5.1-3 acres arbitrarily cut out by a straight line division from the heart of
a tier of proposed residential lots. It is suggested that
Pach of these two is part of a larger parcel extending
to the south· wherein severance damages would be involved, and that each should be segregated from the
39
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balance of the other land of these defendants which has
been taken.
(b)

The re1naining area

of Tract I-D north of Ken-

nedy Drive consists of 5.51 acres. The remaining area
of Tract 1\. . -B north of Kennedy Drive consists of 10.3:~
acres-slightly in excess of the area of a large city block.
If treated as separate parcels, no severance damages
would be involved. It will be recalled that this part of
I-D cornprises ten potential residential lots for which
all utilities have been installed to the extent planned hy
the subdividers; while this part of area IV-B consists
of 10.33 acres suitable and planned for residential developlnent, but wherein no utilities or other improveInent~ have been constructed except for Kennedy Drive.
1Tnder the authorities, together this entire contiguous
area constituted another "parcel."
( 5) Tract IV"-A is an area equal to nearly two city
hlocks-19.G2 acres-on the extreme north of the entire
tract herein condemned. As in the case of IV-B, it is
sui tahle for and had been planned for residential developrnent. However no utilities had yet been installed
and the only actual development on the ground had been
construction of a dividing access road in place-Oa.khills
Road, and an access road to the Jerry Jones property
extending north from Oakhills Road opposite Lot 62
ovvned by W. E. Graham.
(a) The property to the east of the Jerry Jones
road consists of a total of 7.77 acres divided into twentyone lots and streets actually constructed and existing
40
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but not yet dedicated. Of

thi~

65 had been sold to other

area Lots

defendant~

G~,

63, fi-l: and

prior July 12,

1951, the area so sold involving 1.13 acres and road
acees8 rights. These defendants o'vned the re1naining
lots and the roads
stituting another
(b)

eo1npri~ing

H~eparate

a t.otal of 6.G4

acre~,

con-

parcel."

The tract \Vest of the Jerry Jones road

consist~

of 3± lots and streets actually in place although not
dedicated. This area \Yhich \Ve subrnit constitutes a separate and different parcel coinprises a total of 11.85
acres-1nore than a large city block in extent, all of \vhieh
is o'vned by the~e defendants.
6. Finally, there is the balance of the areas denonlinated in the Brayton affidavits, the answer and by the
Yarious 1naps as Tracts I-A, I-B and I-C. Here all utilities are in, and the property actua.Zly exi.sted as a number
of separate residential lots. The law seems clear that a
separate parcel is involved prirna facie for each lot, and
at least for each group of contiguous lots.
The total acreage owned by these defendants in Tract
I-A is 7.51; in Tract I-B, 14.1; and in Tract I-C, 3.96.
Tract I-C is a separate parcel because there the subdivision was not physically coinplete; but in I-A were
19 separate lots, and ±1 separate lots in I-B. ·Grouping
the contiguous lots. as was done in requested Instruction
No. 12 (R. 103), there would be 12 "separate parcels"
in I-A and I-B as follows:
a..

Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Oa.k Hills Pia t A.
41
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b.

Lot 1, Block 2, Oak Hills Plat A.

c.

Lots 5, 6, 7 and 8, Block 2, Oak Hills Plat A.

d.

Lots 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8, Block 3, Oak Hills Plat A.

e.

Lots 1, 2 and 3, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A.

f.

Lot 6, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A.

g.

Lots 8 and 9, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat ~-

h.

Lot 11, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A.

1.

Lots 5 and 6, Oak Hills Plat B.

J·

Lots 10, 11 and 12, Oak Hills Plat B.

k.

Lots 69 to 82, Oak Hills Plat B.

I.

Lots 85 to 106, inclusive, Oak Hills Plat B.

In sumn1ary then, as a matter of law under Section
104-34-10, the property of these defendants under con-

den1na tion consisted of nineteen separate parcels, each to
be separately assessed under mandate of Utah's legislature; and in addition the north parts of two additional
separate parcels. In these last two cases the statutory
mandate was that each of the parts taken was to be
separately assessed; and then there was also to be deterInined the extent of any severance damages to the re·nlaining parts of the two parcels involved.
e.

The effect of the two-parcel decision.
42
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. .\t the oral hearing on the applieation for an inter-

loeutory appeal froln the t\vo-pareel order, nlr. J u~tiee
Crockett i1u1uired a~ to ju~t ho\v conden1nees \vere being
prejudiced by the elaiined violation of the statutory
requiren1ents, and \Y hy \Ve should assu1ne that Judge \Tan
Cott would connnit prejudicial error in the course of the
trial. These questions ,,~ere difficult if not iinpossible
then to ans\Yer, but appellants, fears \Yere fully justified
by subsequent rulings of the court below as a consequenee
of the early decision.
For exa1nple, plaintiff's \Yitnesses were perinitteii
to assmne that since only two sales were to be 1nade
of the two parcels each as a whole, necessarily fron1 the
nature of the parcels the purchasers would be buying
\vholesale at a discount in order to obtain profits by
resale of the individual lots and tracts. Thus, for example, Witness Ashton's opinion started with an assun1ption
that normal fair 1narket values of the various components
of the entire property totaled some $667,000.00. ( Supp.
R. 39.) Then by applying these assumptions he reduced
this total for the two parcels to $491,250.00. ( S.R. 33.)
This was substantially the figure adopted by the jury.
(R. 118.)
Also as a consequence of the two-parcel decision,
the court excluded either on direct or cross exarnina tion
all evidence as to lot values or evidence of any comparable values at all. (S.R. 17, and Point 2 above.) The
defendants were simply unable to support the figures
clai1ned in their stricken separate answer as to the fair
market values of the individual tracts or parcels con43
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stituting their land which was being condemned. The
effect was to condemn not the property taken, but the
o1rners because of the large extent of their holdings.

To illustrate a defendant owning a single lot in Oak
'
Hills is afforded
co1npensation to the extent of its full
1narket ·value. The Deere Estate, owning the identical
adjacent lot, is cut in two by reason of the application
of the \Yholesale discounts, etc. If the ownership of the
two lots were to be reversed, by reason of this change
alont> the values would reverse and the former individually owned lot would be reduced to half its value,
while the Deere Estate lot would be doubled.
Likewise as to land suitable for subdivision but not
yet so subdivided. Mr. Ashton would pay $7500.00 per
acre for a 6-acre tract, but because the Deere Estate
o\vned 1nany more times that acreage, the value of its
land by- virtue of wholesale discounts and a single sale,
etc., \Vould be diminished to $2500.00 per acre.
Finally, the court excluded the entire issue of severance dan1ages, since under its ruling the whole of only
t\vo parrels was to be condemned and there was no roon1
for ~everance da1nages for a partial taking as provided
by the statute. (R. 39, 43.)

. A.ppellants can now answer the questions of the
court at the hearing on the interlocutory appeal by
stating categorically that the failure of the court below
to follow the statutory provisions with respect to the
1nandatory assessment of each separate parcel and the
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deter1uina tion of

~evernJtt.'P

drnnages in the case of partial

takings reduced the a1nount of the a\Yard of dau1ag·p:-;
by perhaps $200,000.00.
f.
,,~ e

Utah Cases:
find no Utah cases in point except by inference

on the reverse of the facts here, the cases of Counnercial
Bank v.

~Iadsen,

supra, and Provo River Water lT ~ers

.A. ssociation v. Carlson, 133 P. :2d 777, 103 Utah 93. In
this latter case conden1nee urged that by reason of his
ownership and co1nn1on use of two non-contiguous tract~,
seYerance damages to the tract not conden1ned "\vere involved in connection with a taking of but part of a single
parcel. However, on the facts of that case and in vievv
of the non-contiguity the Inajority of this court reversed
the decision of the court below, holding that tvvo separate
parcels were involved with a ·complete taking of one
and no seYerance ·damages allowable as to the other.

The difference between these cases, it is respectfully
sub1nitted, is readily apparent from a glance at the 1naps
and a cursory knowledge of the supporting facts. Here
there were many separate parcels involved. The effect
of the court's two-parcel decision, let alone plaintiff's
claiin that all was a single parcel, was to deprive the
owners of their right to just compensation. The rulings
of the court, it is respectfully submitted, were in viola-tion of the well-known due process and equal protection
clauses of Utah's Constitution, Article I, S·ections 7, 22,
24, 26 and 27, a.s well as a flagrant violation of Section
103-34-10.
45

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Likewise was violated the F'ourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution requiring payment of just
con1pensation for the property taken. This has been
held to be "the full and perfect equivalent of the property
taken." Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L. ed. 664. But no such
eo1n pen sa tion is being paid in this instance.
Point.

5. The court improperly eliminated the issue of severence damages.

The issue of severance damages, as in the case 0f
interest as a part of just compensation, is a n1atter separate and apart from that of the proper determination
of the fair market value of the land actually taken.
As discussed at length under Point 4, the court
detern1ined that the whole of each of two separate parcels
'vas being condemned. Hence it ruled that under Section
104-34-10 of the Judicial Code there was no place for
the allowance of any severance damages. The issue was
stricken from the pleadings by eliminating defendants'
avern1ents as to such severance damages set forth in
their answer (R. 39, 41, 43), and the issue was not
submitted to the jury (R. 102).
Apart from the court's determination on other point~
in this appeal, it is respectfully submitted that this case
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions
to reinstate the pleadings a.s to the issue of severance
damages, and to proceed to hear and determine such
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I~

sue.
1\~.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully subrnitted that under the requiren1ent of the Federal and State Constitutions the just
con1pensation to be paid these defendants under the
facts of this particular case require payment of not
only the fair market value of the property taken, but
also interest con1puted at the legal rate in order to compensate the owner for his dan1age fron1 July 12, 1951
when his injury occurred, until May 10, 1952 when the
amount became payable.
It is further submitted that the foregoing_ constitutional requirements as 'vell as statutory directives have
also been violated by reason of the outlined prejudicial
errors committed by the trial court, resulting in depriving the owners from an award of just compensation for
their property. Accordingly, in this respect the judgments of the lower court should be reversed and a new
trial ordered.
C. C. P AR'SONS,
A. D. MOFF:AT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
.Attorneys for .A ppellarnts
and Defendants.
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